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Abstract 
 
Costs are an important component for businesses as they affect the results and hence 
the firm position. Therefore, to understand how they vary with changes in output and what 
factors influence them is fundamental, not only for managers, but for all agents related to 
organizations. 
 
The traditional theory predicts the existence of two types of costs, the variables and 
the fixed ones. However, an alternative hypothesis has emerged that accounts for an 
empirical phenomenon, the "cost stickiness", and later the "anti-stickiness", in which the 
behaviour of costs is based on discretionary management decisions, under different 
circumstances. 
 
In this paper, we show that the operating costs of Euro Area companies are sticky, 
since in the face of a positive change in sales costs increase more than decrease when sales 
fall by the same amount. In addition, we have documented that this phenomenon is 
reinforced in countries where labour law is more rigid and those whose intervention by the 
Troika has been necessary, because these two aspects increase the adjustment costs. 
 
Keywords: cost behaviour, stickiness, anti-stickiness, deliberate resource commitment, 
adjustment costs. 
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Resumo 
 
Os custos são uma importante componente para as empresas, uma vez que afetam 
os seus resultados e, consequentemente, a sua posição. Por isso, perceber como variam face 
a alterações do output e quais os fatores que os influenciam é fundamental, não só para os 
gestores, mas para todos os agentes relacionados com as organizações. 
 
A teoria tradicional prevê a existência de dois tipos de custos, os variáveis e os fixos. 
No entanto, tem surgido uma hipótese alternativa, que dá conta de um fenómeno empírico, 
o “cost stickiness”, e posteriormente o “anti-stickiness”, na qual o comportamento dos custos é 
baseado nas decisões discricionárias de gestão, perante diferentes circunstâncias. 
 
Neste trabalho, mostramos que os custos operacionais das empresas da Zona Euro 
são “sticky”, uma vez que perante uma variação positiva das vendas os custos aumentam mais 
do que diminuem quando as vendas baixam no mesmo montante. Adicionalmente, 
documentamos que este fenómeno é reforçado nos países em que a lei laboral é mais rígida 
e naqueles cuja intervenção da Troika foi necessária, pelo facto destes dois aspetos 
aumentarem os custos de ajustamento. 
 
Palavras-Chave: comportamento dos custos, “stickiness”, “anti-stickiness”, escolhas 
deliberadas de gestão, custos de ajustamento.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding cost behaviour is one of the most important issues in cost accounting. 
This investigation is not only from a theoretical stand point, but also the practical 
implications for all entities, especially for companies, since their purpose is to maximize their 
resources to maximize their profits. Obviously, in pursuit of the main goal of companies, 
costs should be minimized and accounting researchers, as well as practitioners, acknowledge 
the importance of a firm´s cost structure to firm performance. Thus, this study is part of a 
recently emerging stream of research aiming to expand our understanding of cost behaviour 
and point out which factors are vital to explain that behaviour, whether exogenous or 
endogenous to the company itself. 
 
Traditional cost behaviour models in the accounting literature distinguish between 
fixed and variable costs with respect to changes in the level of activity. In fact, a fundamental 
premise of cost accounting is that there is a symmetric relationship between variations in 
activity and in costs. So, a 1% increase in activity results in an increase in costs by a certain 
amount, as well as, a 1% decrease in activity level results in a decrease in costs by the same 
amount. 
 
Recent research documents the empirical phenomenon of “sticky costs”1, which is 
inconsistent with the traditional model of fixed and variable costs, because these costs neither 
behave like fixed or variable costs. However, we cannot say that the traditional theory is 
totally wrong or must be disbelieved. But, underlying the traditional cost behaviour model 
are several assumptions which, apart from simplifying the real world, distance the model 
from the way costs behave. So, it is acceptable that empirically we find a different cost 
behaviour. 
 
                                                          
1 Formally, costs are “sticky” if they respond less to decreases in activity than they raise for an equivalent activity 
increase. 
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In fact, these recent studies have documented strong evidence of asymmetric cost 
behaviour and attributes it to a theory of deliberate managerial decisions in presence of 
adjustment costs (Anderson et al, 2003, hereafter, ABJ). These deliberate decisions have not 
been associated with manipulation or other reprehensible acts in the literature related to 
subject, but an optimal choice to maximize resources. 
 
Recent literature on dynamic factor demand in economics have modelled formally 
these decisions (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), Dixit, (1997), 
Goux et al. (2001)). These studies explicitly model the dynamic optimization problem faced 
by companies, in the presence of adjustment costs and having a future horizon and show 
that the optimal resource commitment decisions are generally asymmetric. Therefore, this 
derives the cost accounting notion of cost stickiness as a direct consequence of optimal 
decisions with adjustment costs. Thus, insofar as managers recognise the trade-off associated 
with the adjustment costs, their choices are expected to introduce a more complex dynamic 
in cost behaviour, resulting in cost stickiness patterns. Also, considering this potential source 
of asymmetry in cost behaviour, and thus, in variation of earnings, it has also been shown to 
be informative in forecasting earnings and understanding earnings management in 
accounting research (Banker and Chen (2006)). 
 
The economic theory of optimal decisions with adjustment costs, described above, 
provides a theoretically sound potential explanation for the widely documented empirical 
patterns of cost stickiness, however it is not the only plausible one. For example, expectations 
of managers about future activity level can also have a strong impact in cost behaviour.  
Banker et al. (2014) noted that the resource expansion associated with activity increases is 
subject to managerial discretion and argued that this discretion can lead to anti-stickiness2 
when managers are pessimistic about the future. Another possible explanation is that 
stickiness may also arise due to manager’s empire-building3 behaviour. 
                                                          
2 The term “anti-stickiness” was coined for the first time by Weiss (2010). However, Weiss just showed that costs 
could be “anti-sticky” if they decrease more when sales fall than they increase when sales rise equally, but he 
didn´t establish when they are likely to be anti-sticky. Banker et al. (2014), contributed to answer this question. 
 
3 It is a characteristic of managers who want to grow the company or group, building an "empire". 
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Our focus will be testing the central implication of the economic theory of optimal 
decisions with adjustment costs. If cost stickiness reflects deliberate resource commitment 
decisions by managers who face adjustment costs, then the degree of stickiness must be like 
the magnitude of these costs. However, it is not easy to identify a reliable proxy for 
adjustment costs in general. Therefore, we will use indexes of employment protection 
legislation (EPL), which are compiled and reported by OECD for most of developed 
countries as reliable proxies for adjustment cost associated with labour. A stricter EPL 
reflects greater adjustment costs for labour, and the economic theory of sticky costs predicts 
that firms in a country with stricter EPL provisions will exhibit greater cost stickiness, which 
lead us to predict a positive relation between country-level EPL strictness and firm-level cost 
stickiness. 
 
In this respect, and to the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that cost 
behaviour will be dealt with in the scope of this Master. So, this paper contributes to the 
literature in three different ways. First, using Banker et al. (2013), as the basis of our work, we 
replicate the models using data for a sample of manufacturing sector firms from 15 Euro 
Area4 countries, which allow us to expand their study. Also, the vast literature on the subject, 
usually studies cost behaviour for American firms. Our sample of Euro Area countries and 
the period that we purpose to study constitutes an innovation. Finally, the introduction of 
macroeconomic variables related to the countries under study is also a contribution. The 
understanding of cost behaviour expands, insofar as it is studied whether this behaviour is 
inherent to the characteristics of the companies, or if it is also affected by the conjuncture of 
each country, namely the intervention of Troika5. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of literature and 
describes different theories of costs behaviour; Section 3 describes the research 
methodology; Section 4 the empirical results and Section 5 presents some robustness tests. 
The conclusion is presented in Section 6.  
                                                          
4 Initially, we collected information from all countries in the Euro Area (19). However, after processing the 
data, we realized that there was not enough information needed to estimate the models in Cyprus, Ireland, 
Lithuania and Malta. Therefore, the final sample has data from 15 countries. 
 
5 Currently, Troika is referred as a decision group formed by the European Commission (EC), the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
4 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Theories and Explanations for Sticky Costs 
 
The traditional view of cost behaviour distinguishes between fixed and variable costs 
with respect to changes in level of activity. Fixed costs are assumed to be independent of the 
level of activity, whereas variable costs are anticipated to change linearly to fluctuations in 
the level of activity, implying that the magnitude of a change in costs depends only on the 
extend of a change in the level of activity, not on the direction of the change (Noreen (1991)). 
However, it might be not totally right. 
 
Cooper and Kaplan (1998) and Noreen and Soderstrom (1997), were the first authors to 
detect that, in fact, not all costs could be classified as fixed or variable costs. In their studies, 
they concluded that some of the costs under analysis increased more when the volume of 
activity increased than diminished with decreases in activity. Nevertheless, ABJ suggest that 
selling, general and administrative costs respond less to downward changes in activity than 
upward changes, a phenomenon they refer to as “sticky costs”. On average, costs increase 
0,55% per 1% increase in sales, but decrease only 0,35% per 1% decrease in revenue in their 
sample. According to ABJ, the prevalence of these costs is consistent with the cost behaviour 
model in which managers adjust resources in a deliberate way in response to changes in 
volume and in the presence of adjustment costs1. For the first time a model distinguishes 
within costs that change in the face of changes in the volume of activity, those that change 
in a "mechanical" way from those that depend on the discretionary choices of the managers. 
Additionally, Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2016) confirm and extend this evidence for  
costs-of-goods expense. 
                                                          
1Briefly, we can say that the adjustment costs are the costs of unexpectedly changing the level of output of a 
firm, regardless of whether it is an increase or decrease thereof. For example, it may be desirable for a firm to 
cut down on its output but, doing so will create adjustment costs such as redundancy payments and lower staff 
morale. On reflection of its adjustment costs, it could be more desirable to keep producing at a sub-optimum 
level. Similarly, a rapid expansion of output may create problems such as difficulties in negotiating a bigger 
place to rent and difficulties in hiring more workers. However, this last situation demands that the resources 
increase, otherwise the output will not be able to increase. Then, as managers recognise the trade-offs that arise 
because of the adjustment costs, they will reduce resources to a lesser extent when the activity shrinks than they 
expand when the activity increases, causing cost stickiness. 
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There are many key factors that affect the way managers decide. For example, when 
future demand is uncertain, and the firm incurs in adjustment costs if it chooses to reduce 
or restructure its resources, managers tend to postpone these reductions until they are more 
certain of the effective fall in demand. It suggests that the stickiness of costs is temporary, 
because somewhere in the future will be reversed or made effective. So, the stickiness 
observed over a period may be reversed in the following period and that this feature may be 
less pronounced when the observation period is longer. In periods of decline in economic 
activity and consequent fall in sales, managers must decide whether to keep the same 
resources and support the operational costs of having unused capacity or support the 
adjustment costs related to the cut in resources. This decision will depend on the likelihood 
that sales will continue to fall or not. Thus, the stickiness will be stronger when the 
expectations of managers about the steady drop in demand are low or when the adjustment 
costs are greater. ABJ argue that managers hesitate to eliminate slack resources when they 
expect a sales drop to be temporary, causing cost stickiness when activity level decrease. 
However, when it is intended to increase output, it is inevitable to increase resources, since 
without this it is impossible to increase the level of activity of the firm. 
 
In addition to demand uncertainty, financial risk is another factor that will likely 
influence manager’s decisions. Financial risk can be defined as the potential future inability 
of the company to honour its financial commitments and has adverse direct and indirect 
effects for the company. Direct consequences are intuitively identified, since if the company 
fails to make a financial commitment, its capital costs increase and the probability of having 
legal problems is higher too. Moreover, after having identified the direct consequences, 
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), proved that indirect consequences can be quite significant and 
are unobservable opportunity costs like loss of stakeholders. Naturally, companies with an 
already high level of risk tend to prefer a cost structure that fits the circumstances more 
quickly. So, managers of these firms are more likely to take actions that increase cost elasticity 
to reduce additional risk, otherwise with inelastic cost structures the vulnerability to demand 
shocks is higher. 
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These two factors were extensively studied by Holzhacker et al. (2015), to obtain 
information on the mechanisms used by companies in response to these two factors. They 
believe that, in response to the two risk drivers, managers change their resource decisions, 
to increase their elasticity. In a firm with a less elastic cost structure, the decrease in demand 
will have a more negative impact on profit than on a company with a more elastic structure, 
because the same decrease in quantity will decrease a lower proportion of costs. Therefore, 
as demand uncertainty and financial risk increase, managers will be more likely to explore 
mechanisms to increase the elasticity of firm´s cost structure. In this regard, managers can 
take three actions, namely outsourcing, leasing or rental of equipment and restructuring of 
work contracts to increase the proportion of flexible ones. 
 
Banker et al. (2014), improved the theory of sticky costs and developed empirical 
models. Prior research has shown that the stickiness of costs is pervasive across different 
cost categories and different datasets. However, these authors show that ABJ's intuition gives 
rise to a more complex asymmetry pattern that goes beyond their predictions and combines 
two processes: stickiness when there is a previous increase in sales and  
anti-stickiness in the case of a prior reduction of sales. They have justified these forecasts, 
firstly because, after a prior increase (decrease) in sales, managers' expectations for future 
sales are more optimistic (pessimistic), since sales changes are positively correlated over time, 
and behaviour economic studies suggest managers extrapolate past trends. Optimism 
increase managers' willingness to acquire additional resources when sales increase and to 
retain some unused ones when sales decrease. One the other hand, pessimism has the 
opposite effect. Below, they believe that managers retained significant slack resources only if 
sales decreased in a prior period. When sales increase, the amount of slack carried over into 
the current period is weak or non-existent. These two effects lead to cost stickiness in the 
current period only in the case of a prior sales increase, and they generate the opposite 
predictions of anti-stickiness following a prior sales decrease. In accordance with this finding, 
it was noticed that the slack resources provoke asymmetry in the behaviour of costs which 
is determined by the direction of the variation of the sales in the previous period. Overall, 
the results support ABJ's fundamental view that asymmetric costs behaviour reflects 
deliberate decisions of managers on a "forward-looking"2. 
                                                          
2 This term means that managers make their decisions having as horizon the future. Basically, they make 
decisions not only to affect the present, but also in a more medium-term perspective. 
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On the other hand, changes in sales may reflect changes in short-term market 
conditions or longer-term changes in demand for products or services. Therefore, when 
managers face a decrease in sales, they do not react immediately, in order to perceive the 
source of the change and then react accordingly. This "delay" causes cost stickiness, as the 
unused resources are maintained during the period between the volume reduction and the 
adjustment decision. Another important aspect is that costs become less sticky as revenue 
declines over several periods, as the expectations of the decision maker are aligned with the 
sales situation. If sales are constantly declining, managers will inevitably have to dispose of 
resources, incurring the costs of adjustment. 
 
Prior research of sticky costs has relied on informal arguments about the  
trade-off that arise with adjustment costs. However, the literature of dynamic factor demand 
in economics has explored these trade-offs more deeply. In this dynamic context, the optimal 
level of resources corresponds to the amount at which the marginal adjustment costs 
incurred per unit of resource in the current period equals the present value of expected net 
cash flows generated by the marginal resource unit over its service life. When deciding how 
much to reduce resources when activity levels fall, managers weigh the benefits of more 
efficient operations against the adjustment costs they must incur. Consequently, this  
trade-off often causes deliberate retention of some resources that will not be used to avoid 
incurring adjustment costs. In addition, managers have much less discretion over the 
acquisition of the necessary resources when the activity increases, since even if they intend 
not to incur adjustment costs, this will not happen, because without resources, companies 
are not able to respond to increases of activity. In this way, the asymmetry provoked by 
managers' choices is caused by optimization decisions. 
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Despite the importance of adjustment costs in this new theory of cost behaviour, 
there are also other reasons that explain the sticky behaviour of costs. For example, the 
character of the manager may have an impact on the behaviour of costs. Authors like 
Anderson et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2012), report that more empire-building managers are 
more reluctant to cut resources even in the presence of declining sales, thereby increasing 
the stickiness of some costs. In addition, when sales increase they are very likely to 
immediately increase the company's resources. So, if managers engage in empire-building, it 
can generate cost stickiness, even in the absence of adjustment costs. Additionally,  
Banker et al. (2014) noted that the managers' expectations about the future activity also 
condition the behaviour of costs, provoking stickiness. Although behavioural factors of 
managers do not determine the overall structure of behaviour of asymmetric costs, they 
accentuate or diminish their magnitude. The stickiness can also be conditioned by the 
existing capacity. Balakrishnan et al. (2004) have found, for example, that an organization that 
operates to the maximum of its capacity when confronted with a reduction in activity 
responds less than if it encounters an increase in activity.  
 
Despite all explanations for cost behaviour, we believe the theory of optimal resource 
commitment decisions with adjustment costs provide a theoretically sound explanation for 
the widely documented empirical findings of costs stickiness. Moreover, according to this 
theory, these discretionary choices reflect a behaviour desired by the managers, who do 
optimal choices that increases the value of the company. The same does not happen with 
other possible explanations, for example with empire building theory. It is assumed that the 
choices of the managers may not be optimal and be harmful to the proper company, 
becoming a waste that withdraw value from the company. 
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2.2. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
 
As stated above, the adjustment costs play a central role in the new theory of cost 
behaviour. However, as the adjustment costs are implicit costs rather than explicit monetary 
costs expressed in accounting system (Hamermesh and Pfann, (1996)), it is not possible to 
measure this directly and it is not easy to obtain a proxy for these, too. For this reason, a few 
works have been able to study this relation. They use firm-level proxies specifically for labour 
factor, such as employee intensity or assets. For exemple, the first authors that document 
pervasive asymmetries in cost behaviour, ABJ, used both proxies. In addition, prior research 
used the rigidity of the labour market as proxy of the adjustment costs, a country-level proxy. 
We exploit these country-level proxies, but we also control for firm-level determinants of 
cost stickiness, following prior literature. In fact, EPL has been widely used, and has been 
shown to be reliable, in prior economics research (e.g., Long and Siebert (1983); Lazear (1990); 
Pissarides (1999); Blanchard and Portugal (2001)). According to Banker et al. (2013), the major 
advantage of EPL is that they are exogenous with respect to managers' decisions, so it cannot 
be manipulated or changed according to the will of the managers. 
 
Historically, the first cases of statutory employment protection date back to the early 
twentieth century. However, the process of increasingly regulating firing and hiring, since 
free labour market seems to be inefficient, is a recent system that became to be stable at the 
1900s. By contrast, since the global financial crisis in 2008, and according to OECD (2013), 
there is a clear trend of deregulation of employment protection. Obviously, this tendency is 
not observed in every OECD countries and they have different levels of employment 
protection. But, in one-third of them undertook some relaxation of regulations on either 
individual or collective dismissals, thereby reducing the gap in the stringency affecting 
temporary and permanent contracts. Interestingly, policy action was more intense in OECD 
countries that had most stringent legislation before the onset of the crisis, in order to 
liberalize the labour market. Despite this flexibility, particularly in terms of severance 
payments and fixed-term contracts, EPL still translates into high costs for companies when 
they decide to lay off. 
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In this sense, the provisions of the Employment Protection Legislation, such as the 
rigidity indexes of labour laws, are explored to see if the costs are in fact sticky or not. The 
asymmetry envisaged by the sticky cost theory might be due to deliberate decisions made by 
managers facing adjustment costs (such as costs of hiring and firing staff, including severance 
payments to dismissed workers or search and training costs when new employees are hired, 
or disposal losses on equipment). The manager's optimal decisions are made by analysing the 
trade-off between the adjustment costs associated with the hiring or firing of a marginal 
worker and the net present value of the cash flows (NPV) that this worker must generate 
during the time he remains in the company. When the activity increases, managers hire 
additional workers if the marginal worker's NPV exceeds the cost of hiring. On the other 
hand, when activity decreases, managers will lay off workers, provided that the marginal 
worker's NPV is negative and large enough (in absolute value) to exceed the cost of 
redundancy.  
 
The results of Banker et al. (2013), show that the relationship between the stickiness 
of costs and the rigidity of the EPL in the data is consistent with the theory that the stickiness 
of costs reflects the deliberate decisions of managers. In this way, it was found that a 
company operating in a country with more stringent EPL (i.e., higher adjustment costs to 
reduce labour) will exhibit more cost stickiness, i.e. more asymmetry in cost response to 
changes in sales. In addition, Caballero (2013) showed that the rigidity of the EPL reduces the 
ability of companies to adjust to shocks, which corroborates the idea that greater rigidity of 
the labour law increases the costs of adjustment of the companies, consequently causing 
greater stickiness of the companies’ costs. 
 
It should be noted that there is a vast literature devoted to examining the various 
aspects of EPL, as well as other characteristics of the labour market (e.g., Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1993); Mortensen and Pissarides (1999); Heckman et al. (2000); Botero et al. (2004)). They 
document that EPL is the main source of firing costs and that it has important effects on 
various macroeconomic outcomes, such as unemployment rates and long-term productivity 
growth. Notably, EPL indexes serve as a proxy for firing costs because, although EPL 
provisions impose considerable firing costs, they do not impose any hiring costs. However, 
our focus is different, because we would like to understand the role of EPL in firm-level cost 
behaviour, more than its role in macroeconomic outcomes. 
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The next challenge is to identify the most appropriate empirical measure to quantify 
EPL and other control variables associated with labour. In this context,  
Botero et al. (2004) investigated the impact of labour market regulation in 85 countries. To do 
so, they constructed a set of data that captured such regulations, including three major areas: 
i labour laws, ii collective relations laws, and iii social security laws. With this information 
they constructed indicators that summarize the different dimensions of this protection and, 
finally, aggregate these indicators into indexes. Note that higher values in these indexes 
correspond to a broader labour protection of workers. This technique is like what OECD 
has been using to define the EPL, which will be our proxy3. 
 
As we show in previous section, the new theory of sticky costs implies that higher 
downward adjustment costs lead to greater stickiness in resource adjustment. Because stricter 
EPL increases the magnitude of firing costs, we expect stricter EPL to increase the stickiness 
of labour costs. Since the labour costs account for a large fraction of operating costs, we 
expect stricter EPL to increase the stickiness of operating costs, leading to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: The more restricted the country's labour law (e.g., higher EPL), the greater degree 
of stickiness of operating costs.  
                                                          
3 For a detailed summary of the indexes that constitute EPL, please see Appendix A. 
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2.3. The crisis affecting the Euro Area and the intervention of Troika 
 
Despite the central role of EPL in our study, we intend to realize the impact that the 
recent crisis of 2008 may have had on cost behaviour, because this global crisis had a 
profound impact on financial deregulation that cannot be left aside. 
 
It began in 2007 with a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in the United States 
of America, and developed into a full-blown international banking crisis with the collapse of 
the investment bank Lehman Brothers on 2008 September 15th. Briefly, banks had allowed 
people to take out loans for 100 percent or more of the value of their homes. Then, banks 
engage in trading profitable derivatives that they sold to investors. These mortgage-backed 
securities needed home loans as collateral. The derivatives created an insatiable demand for 
more and more mortgages. The main problem occurred when housing prices started to fall. 
Hedge funds and other financial institutions around the world owned the mortgage-backed 
securities. The pooled mortgages were used to back securities known as collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs), which were sliced into tranches by degree of exposure to default. In 
addition, it was created an insurance product called credit default swaps, sold by traditional 
insurance companies. When the derivatives lost value, these companies didn´t have enough 
cash to honour their commitments. The whole system was revealed to have been built on 
flimsy foundations: banks had allowed their balance-sheets to bloat but set aside too little 
capital to absorb losses. In effect they had bet on themselves with borrowed money, a gamble 
that had paid off in good times but proved catastrophic in bad. 
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With the globalization we have come about in recent decades, particularly the 
interconnection in the financial sector, this banking crisis in the United States has rapidly 
spread to other sectors of society and to the rest of the world. It was a large symmetric shock 
with significant asymmetric effects. According to OECD (2006), it was not predictable that 
the world economic situation would become so difficult. It is said that “economic conditions are 
projected to continue to improve in the OECD area during the next two years and unemployment rates to 
continue to fall (…). Economic growth in the OECD are is showing considerable resilience in an environment 
characterised by geographical tensions, large current account imbalances and high volatility in energy prices”. 
However, the consequences of crisis are mirrored in the following reports of OECD 
Employment Outlook 2013 and 2016. The first report indicates that the global recovery from 
the crisis has been weak and uneven, with increasingly divergent rhythms of development 
across countries. The main problems identified in this report are a sharp drop in demand, 
persistent high unemployment rates which causes an increasing income inequality due to the 
concentration of job losses among low-paid worker and slower growth in real earnings. Once 
again, it is important to note that the effects of crisis were not uniform across countries, 
which increased the gap between OECD countries. Eight years after the onset crisis, the 
report of 2016 says that economy was not recovered yet, especially labour market, despite 
conditions having slightly improved. In addition, OECD (2016) draws attention to the risk 
of another downturn before the total recovery in many countries. 
 
For this reason, some of the countries most affected by the crisis were intervened by 
the Troika, with the aim of recovering and correcting some errors, so as not to be so 
vulnerable to external shocks. In this context, in May 2010, Greece agreed the first rescue 
plan with the Troika, but in February 2012, the rescue was reinforced with an extraordinary 
package. Ireland was the second country to be rescued in November 2010. The Portuguese 
Government advanced to the rescue in May 2011. Finally, Cyprus also enlisted the help of 
the Troika in March 2013. Before the rescue of Cyprus, Spain had been the last country to 
intervene, in an operation that took place in June 2012. However, for the purposes of this 
study we will not consider Spain has an intervened country, since Madrid managed to avoid 
a bailout plan for the economy, limiting it only to banking. 
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Theoretically, it is expected that the intervention of Troika in these countries may 
have affected and continue to affect the expectations of managers and thus the behaviour of 
costs. The presence of the Troika has imposed a greater restriction on labour legislation and 
other areas, which means that hiring and/or firing has become more complex and more 
expensive. In this way, increasing complexity tends to retract managers from engaging in 
these processes, thus increasing the stickiness of associated costs. Only a few years later, the 
labour market became less strict, however, despite all efforts to make labour legislation more 
flexible (because of the Troika intervention), labour market rigidities in those countries 
(namely in Portugal and Greece) are still higher than in other countries, which is directly 
reflected in a greater cost stickiness. 
 
In short, as far as we know, it is the first time that this effect has been studied in cost 
behaviour, which, like the rigidity of the labour law, is an exogenous effect on managers, but 
profoundly affects their decisions, in particular the decisions related to labour. Therefore, for 
everything that was previously mentioned, we expect that: 
 
H2: Firms located in countries with Troika’s intervention have more stickiness in 
costs than the rest.
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In our study, we empirically examine the relationship between employment 
protection, the intervention of Troika and cost stickiness for firms in the Euro Area member 
countries. We choose this research setting because it includes a set of developed economies 
which use the same currency. This aspect was determinant in our choice, because in this way 
we avoid possible constraints and bias results caused by using of different currencies. In this 
way, we take advantage of this specificity of the Euro Area, to obtain the truest results 
possible. Although most of the studies used as a basis for our analysis use data from United 
States of America companies or located in OECD countries, we consider that our innovative 
sample can be a contribution to the literature, while allowing us to leverage these studies 
both in identifying the appropriate empirical measure of EPL and in formulating our 
empirical predictions and models. In addition, measures of EPL and other labour market 
characteristics are reliably and systematically reported for these developed countries, which 
is a practical aspect essential to our analysis. 
 
3.1. Variables 
 
We use the index 𝑐 for country, the index 𝑓 for firm and the index 𝑡 for the year. 
Then, the dependent variable is defined as 𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡, that is Operational Costs for firm 𝑓, 
country 𝑐 and year 𝑡. This variable result from the difference between Operating Revenue 
(item OPRE of Amadeus) and Operating Profit/Loss (item OPPL of Amadeus)1 and it is 
deflated to control for inflation2. 
 
We use three types of explanatory variables: firm-level variables, country-level 
variables and control variables. 
 
                                                          
1 Although the inclusion of depreciation reduces the proportion of labour costs in the dependent variable, we 
decided to include it in order to obtain a dependent variable as realistic and complete as possible. 
 
2 Please note that all variables that were deflated to control for inflation have as base year the year of 2008, that 
is, they are in constant prices of 2008. For example, to obtain the deflated sales value in the 2009 we use Sales 
2009 / (1+ i), where i is the annual GDP growth rate between 2008 and 2009. 
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The main firm-level variable is 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡, defined as Sales Revenue
3 for firm 𝑓, 
country 𝑐 and year 𝑡, (item TURN of Amadeus) also deflated to control for inflation. Another 
important variable is 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡, that is the Real GDP growth for country 𝑐 in year 𝑡, 
from World Bank Databank defined as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant local currency, where aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. 
dollars. The  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 is the Asset Intensity for firm 𝑓, country 𝑐 and year 𝑡, as the log 
ratio of Assets (item TOAS of Amadeus) and Sales, defined as ln (
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
). Then, we have one 
of the main explanatory variables, the 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 which is the aggregate index of employment 
protection legislation in country 𝑐 in year t, computed as the mean of TempEPL and RegEPL, 
following OECD (2004). 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 is an index of employment protection legislation for 
temporary employees in country 𝑐 in year t, from OECD Database, ranges from zero to six, 
and higher values mean stricter EPL and 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 is an index of employment protection 
legislation for regular employees in country 𝑐 in year t, from OECD Database, ranges from 
zero to six, and higher values mean stricter EPL. 
 
Finally, we have two dummies variables, namely, 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡, a dummy variable equal 
to one when sales decreases and zero otherwise and 𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐, a dummy variable equal to 
one if firm is in Portugal or Greece and zero otherwise. 
 
We use 𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 and 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡, since it is the relationship between these two 
variables that it is intends to study (annual changes in operating costs to contemporaneous 
changes in sales revenue), following Noreen and Soderstrom (1997). However, this relationship 
is affected by other county-level explanatory variables, firm-level control variables, following 
prior studies (e.g., ABJ), as well as additional country-level random effects. 
 
                                                          
3 We use sales revenue as proxy of sales volume, because it is not directly observable. 
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According to ABJ, the GDP growth and the successive decreases in sales 
(𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1) can be empirical proxies for optimism and pessimism, respectively. We use 
asset intensity,  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡, as an additional proxy at firm-level for the magnitude of the 
adjustment costs that firms face, such as Banker et.al. (2013). Initially, we intended to include 
a dummy variable CommonLaw, separating common-law countries from code-law4 countries, 
because prior research (e.g., La Porta et al. (1997), (1998), (2000)) demonstrated that the legal 
origin of a country is one of the main drivers of differences between countries in terms of 
business management, access to external financing, business regulation, among others. In 
addition, Botero et al. (2004) find strong evidence that the legal origin of a country is an 
important determinant in both labour regulation and in other markets, concluding that 
countries have ways of regulating that are pervasive in all activities and shaped by their legal 
origin. However, in our sample there are not common-law countries. So, it was not necessary 
to use this dummy variable. Finally, our proxy for labour adjustment costs is EPL, following 
Banker et.al. (2013). Basically, it is the set of rules regarding the dismissal of employees, 
including procedural restrictions on demission and the rules regarding severance pay levels. 
This protection imposes considerable firing costs on employers, and the more restricted is 
the protection, the higher are the costs (Long and Siebert (1983); Mortensen and Pissarides (1999); 
OECD (2004)). About the patterns 𝑣1,𝑛  and 𝑣2,𝑛, they capture the cross-country random 
effects, which are not captured by the explanatory variables of the models, so these terms 
must be independent of these variables. 
  
                                                          
4 The type of legal system used is a key factor in explaining many differences between countries. Generally, the 
countries are divided into two groups: common-law countries and the code-law. It is said that a country is a 
common law type when the law is based more on jurisprudence (set of interpretations of the rules of law given 
by the judiciary) than on the text of the law. To emphasize that in these countries there is also a law that must 
be complied with, however the main reason for decision is the decision made in previous similar cases. When 
there is no precedent, judges must "create the right," setting that precedent. On the other hand, in the code-
law countries there is a written, systematic and comprehensive declaration of laws when promulgating the code. 
In simple terms, the law is a systematic list of articles that have been codified and are required by law. 
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3.2. Sample 
 
The sample includes all active manufacturing firms (NACE 10-32, excluding 18) 
covered by Amadeus during 2008-20135 from Euro Area, with data available for those same 
years, which led us to an initial sample of 281 518 companies in the 19 Euro Area countries. 
We exclude the other sectors of activity because the structure of costs and the type of activity 
are too different which could make our sample too heterogeneous and complex, which must 
prevent clear results. Then, we follow Banker et.al. (2013) in using annual data for our tests 
and in the application of some restrictions to the data. We use country-specific GDP 
deflators6 to control for inflation. The sample includes firm-year observations with positive 
values for sales, operating costs and assets, because we discard observations when these 
values are missing or negative for the current year. Additionally, we also discard firm-years if 
operating costs are less than 50% or greater than 200% of sales for current year. 
 
To limit the effect of extreme observations, we then discard 0,5 % outliers in the 
right tail for the operating costs (the dependent variable) and for the sales and for total assets 
(the continuous firm-level explanatory variables). Once again, following Banker et.al. (2013), 
we discard firm-year if sales increased by more than 50% or decreased by more than 33% in 
the current year7, because it may reflect mergers or divestitures. The final sample includes 
627 778 observations for 104 993 firms in 15 Euro Area countries for the period of  
2008-2013. 
 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3 and will be discussed in 
subsection 4.1. 
  
                                                          
5 For most countries in Amadeus, data are available only for 2008 onwards. Besides that, information pertaining 
to the EPL is only available up to the year 2013. 
 
6 The annual GDP deflators are taken from World Bank Databank: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators&amp;preview=on 
 
7 These percentage values are the transformation of log-change from ln(2/3) and ln(3/2), which we use in the 
estimation. 
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3.3. Empirical Models 
 
Following what has been done we intend to investigate the behaviour of costs that 
are atypical, considering the traditional theory of accounting. Generally, we consider that the 
operational costs are variable costs, because they are closely related to the sales and the 
volume of activity of the company. However, as already mentioned above, some authors 
show that, in fact, some costs cannot be classified as variables, because they do not behave 
symmetrically in the face of an increase or decrease of sales. 
 
In this sense, such as Banker et al. (2013), we will use the labour law as a proxy of the 
adjustment cost of this factor. Moreover, we will include some variables that allow us to 
capture the importance of the macroeconomic situation in costs behaviour. Finally, we 
intend to use a variable that allows us to distinguish between the countries that have been 
intervened by the Troika, from those who did not need this intervention, to test H2. In this 
context, we begin with the following model of cost behaviour that links annual changes in 
operating costs (𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡) to contemporaneous changes in sales (𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡). The base 
model8 of our estimation was presented by ABJ: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑓,𝑡    (1) 
 
where ∆𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 is the log-change in operating costs, ∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 is the log-change in 
sales, 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 is a dummy variable that is equal to one when sales decrease in year t and zero 
otherwise, 𝑢𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 is a random effect that as zero mean and is independent of any explanatory 
variable. The slope 𝛼1,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 represents the percentage change in costs for 1% increase in sales 
and the sum of 𝛼1,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 and 𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 represents the change in costs for 1 % decrease in sales. 
Given the model specification, the slope 𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 captures the degree of asymmetry in costs 
behaviour. If it is positive, we are in presence of anti-stickiness, however if it is negative, the 
costs are sticky. Moreover, if traditional model is valid, 𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 would be equal to zero and 
𝛼1,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 equal to one, reflecting proportionality. 
                                                          
8 This model has been widely used in studies on this subject because it is the standard cost stickiness model. 
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Our use of log-linear specification follows prior researches  
(e.g., Noreen and Soderstrom (1997), Banker et al. (1995), Anderson et al. (2003)). Usually, log-linear 
models have several advantages over a linear model. First, the coefficients in the log-linear 
model have a clear economic interpretation as percentage change in the dependent variable 
for a 1% change in independent variable. In addition, log transformation makes variables 
more comparable across firms and moderate the problem of heteroskedasticity, improving 
the efficiency of estimates. 
 
Since we do not just want to determine whether the costs behaviour is asymmetric, 
but rather to perceive the source of this asymmetry, we specified the slopes coefficient as: 
 
𝛼1,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝜆1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐  
+ 𝑣1,𝑛                                                                                                                   (2) 
 
𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽2 + 𝜆5𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆6𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝜆7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜆8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜆9𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐
+ 𝑣2,𝑐                                                                                                                   (3) 
 
where 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 is the employment protection legislation index for country c, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 is 
the real rate of GDP growth for country c in year t, 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 is the log-ratio of total 
assets to sales of firm f ,country c and year t, 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable equals to one 
for firms whose sales decrease in the period t-1, 𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐 is a dummy variable equals to 
one for Portuguese and Greek firms, and 𝑣1,𝑛 and 𝑣2,𝑐 are country-level error terms. 
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Briefly, we followed Anderson et al. (2003) and Banker et.al. (2013) and extend these 
models by allowing Troika’s intervention to affect not only the degree of stickiness (𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡) 
but also the slope of sales increase (𝛼1,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡). As we discuss above, managers make 
discretionary decisions, both in decreasing and in expanding resources. However, according 
to the new theory of cost behaviour, firing costs also affect hiring decisions. Therefore, the 
intervention of Troika may affect not only 𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 but also 𝛼1,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡. Obviously, we expected 
the same logic for the other introduced variables capable of influencing managers' decisions 
both in the case of increase or decrease sales. By including variables as GDP growth or asset 
intensity in the slope of sales increase, we followed Banker et al. (2013) that made an empirical 
model that overcame a problem identified in ABJ’s study. ABJ presumed managerial 
discretion only for sales decreases and assumed a mechanical behaviour when sales increase. 
Therefore, Banker et al. (2013) nested this specification under the restriction 
𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 𝜆3 = 𝜆4 = 0, which was rejected in their data and in our data too. 
 
By combining Equation 1, 2 and 3, we have our main model: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 + 𝜆1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜆4𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐) ∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 + (𝛽2 + 𝜆5𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆6𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1
+ 𝜆7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜆8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜆9𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐)𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑐,𝑓,𝑡                                                                                                                  (4) 
 
where the variables are has described above and 𝜀𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 is the random effect, which combines 
the residuals from equation 1, 2 and 3. The main parameters of the estimation are 𝜆5 to test 
H1 and 𝜆9 to test H2. We predict that 𝜆5 < 0, because H1 implies that stricter EPL is 
associated with a more negative 𝛼2,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 indicating cost stickiness. Then, we also predict that 
𝜆9 < 0 ussing the same logic, but with Troika’s variable. 
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The estimation method we use is ordinary least squares (OLS) like ABJ. Though, the 
inclusion of random effects at country-level 𝑣1,𝑐 and 𝑣2,𝑐 presents cross-section correlation 
in 𝜀𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 of firms within each country. This also introduces heteroskedasticity, since the 
random shocks 𝑣1,𝑐 and 𝑣2,𝑐 are multiplied by ∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 e 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑐,𝑓,𝑡, 
respectively. Moreover, to the within-country correlations across firms, the random shocks 
may also be correlated across countries, because of global economics events, like the crisis 
of 2008. To address these problems, we use HAC – Newey-West, that is a tool provided by 
EViews that allow us to adjust standard errors for the presence of both autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. As expected, the estimated coefficient values do not change, when 
compared to the original estimation. But, the adjusted standard errors and associated  
T-statistics are different. We would like to point out that we performed multiple estimations, 
with panel data and with unstructured data, with and without fixed effects, to understand the 
impact of dynamic effects, with the HAC – Newey-West method and without, in order to 
determine the associated problems with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and the 
results have practically not changed. Thus, we consider that our results are robust enough. 
 
Finally, we will carry out some robustness checks, inter alia, through the estimation 
of cost stickiness framework developed by Banker et al. (2014) that will be presented and 
estimated in section 5. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1.  Univariate Results 
 
The Table 1 presents some summary statistics that allows us to study the main 
characteristics of our sample, in general. All values are the average for each variable. Then, 
Table 2 will present one panel for each variable with more details, such as the mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, Skewness and Kurtosis and the number of 
observations for each of the 15 countries of our sample (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain). Finally, Table 3 shows Pearson’s correlations coefficients to 
capture the correlation between dependent and independent variables. 
 
Focusing on Table 1, there is a substantial variation in percentage of observations 
per country. France and Italy together have more the 50% of the total observations, followed 
by Spain with 20% of the observations. That is why we present in Section 5 a robustness 
check where we discard France and Italy data from our sample. The results are similar to our 
main estimates for H1, but different for H2. Portugal is also well represented in our sample, 
with 9,82% of the data. 
 
Moreover, the crisis of 2008 is well reflected in the univariate results, because as we 
can see, the mean of AssetInt, ∆lnOPC, ∆lnSALES and GDPGrowth for most of countries 
is negative. In fact, the sample period under analysis refers to the years of widespread crisis 
in the world. As discussed above, countries were not all affected equally by this crisis, and 
this is also exorbitant in our data. As might be expected, the countries most affected by the 
crisis are those with the biggest declines, namely in sales and GDP growth. For exemple, 
Greece has the biggest decline in ∆lnSALES (i.e., 0,035) and between 2008 and 2013 on 
average the GDP growth was -4,965, followed by Latvia and Italy with -1,494 and -1,456, 
respectively. Therefore, these numbers reinforce the importance of using our Troika´s 
variable and corroborate what happened, it could be said that these variables have economic 
significance. In addition, the variation of ∆lnOPC and ∆lnSALES is similar for most of 
countries however the correlation between them is 0,841 that is high but not perfect, which 
indicates stickiness.  
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Finally, H1 implies differences in EPL indexes, that range from 0 to 6 where 6 
represents the strictest EPL. In our sample, the mean EPL is 2, 582 which indicates that our 
countries are moderated, however, there is a considerable variation in overall EPL strictness. 
The Portugal, Luxembourg and France have the highest scores (2,945, 2,998 and 3,012, 
respectively) whereas Latvia and Austria have the lowest scores (1,781 and 1,841, 
respectively). The correlation between TempEPL and RegEPL is - 0,416 which means that 
the correlation is low, besides we can say that countries with stricter EPL for regular workers 
have greater flexibility EPL for temporary workers. For exemple, Latvia has low EPL for 
temporary workers (the lowest for our sample, at 0,875 which is lower than the median 2) 
but features stricter EPL for regular workers (at 2,687 which is higher than the median 2,468). 
On the other hand, Luxembourg has below-median EPL for regular workers (2,246) but has 
the strictest EPL for temporary workers (3,75). 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Country 
% of 
Obs. 
AssetInt ∆lnOPC ∆lnSALES GDPGrowth EPL TempEPL RegEPL 
Austria 0,04 -0,027 0,022 -0,014 0,546 1,841 1,313 2,369 
Belgium 1,75 -0,333 -0,005 -0,008 0,584 2,166 2,375 1,956 
Estonia 0,79 -0,489 -0,007 -0,007 -0,684 2,092 2,062 2,121 
Finland 2,60 -0,503 -0,016 -0,021 -0,676 1,865 1,563 2,167 
France 24,88 -0,465 0,005 0,001 0,342 3,012 3,625 2,399 
Germany 2,43 -0,544 0,003 0,004 0,709 1,850 1,021 2,679 
Greece 1,47 0,291 -0,035 -0,037 -4,965 2,508 2,541 2,476 
Italy 33,66 -0,030 -0,015 -0,017 -1,456 2,374 2,000 2,748 
Latvia 0,12 -0,536 0,033 0,033 -1,494 1,781 0,875 2,687 
Luxembourg 0,04 -0,169 -0,013 -0,011 0,845 2,998 3,750 2,246 
Netherlands 0,23 -0,430 0,002 0,001 -0,052 1,885 0,938 2,832 
Portugal 9,82 -0,083 -0,008 -0,013 -1,310 2,945 1,917 3,974 
Slovakia 1,09 -0,458 -0,007 -0,009 1,874 2,220 1,813 2,627 
Slovenia 1,03 -0,091 -0,011 -0,013 -1,017 1,870 1,667 2,073 
Spain 20,04 -0,144 -0,026 -0,031 -1,345 2,530 2,802 2,258 
Total 100 -0,202 -0,011 -0,014 -0,863 2,582 2,529 2,635 
         
AssetInt is defined as 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
), ∆lnOPC is the first difference of the logarithm of operational costs, 
∆lnSALES is the first difference of logarithm of sales revenue, GDPGrowth is defined as the annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency, EPL is the aggregate index of employment protection 
legislation, computed as the mean of TempEPL (an index of employment protection legislation for temporary employees) 
and RegEPL (an index of employment protection legislation for regular employees). The sample includes companies for 
the 15 Euro Area countries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2013.   
25 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics per Variable 
Table 2 Panel A AssetInt defined as ln((Total Asset)/(Sales Revenue)) 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
Austria -0,027 -0,026 1,412 -1,265 0,490 0,027 2,465 248 
Belgium -0,333 -0,387 5,099 -2,602 0,668 1,178 8,200 10979 
Estonia -0,489 -0,480 1,616 -2,967 0,659 -0,108 3,390 4936 
Finland -0,503 -0,512 4,977 -3,829 0,624 0,597 6,703 16321 
France -0,465 -0,485 6,209 -6,857 0,523 0,589 7,865 156174 
Germany -0,544 -0,563 5,273 -3,255 0,591 0,826 8,056 15258 
Greece 0,291 0,263 3,168 -1,751 0,568 0,361 3,931 9259 
Italy -0,030 -0,092 4,986 -3,400 0,560 1,178 7,613 211341 
Latvia -0,536 -0,534 1,269 -2,071 0,601 0,207 2,959 730 
Luxembourg -0,169 -0,254 3,071 -1,516 0,713 1,692 8,482 270 
Netherlands -0,430 -0,468 2,905 -2,382 0,619 0,855 5,726 1473 
Portugal -0,083 -0,098 3,690 -6,808 0,626 0,190 4,481 61669 
Slovakia -0,458 -0,476 4,912 -6,309 0,660 0,457 8,757 6816 
Slovenia -0,091 -0,099 2,987 -2,765 0,550 0,291 4,194 6497 
Spain -0,144 -0,174 3,855 -5,691 0,654 0,281 4,396 125807 
Total -0,202 -0,239 6,209 -6,857 0,618 0,571 5,756 627778 
 
As we can see in Table 2 panel A, the average for AssetInt is negative for all countries 
of our sample, excepted Greece. A negative ln (
Total Asset
Sales Revenue
) means that Total Assets is less 
than Sales Revenue, because for a logarithm to be negative, the value to logarithmize must 
be less than 1. Usually, it is said that this type of firm generates a lot of revenue with little 
investment and so have a higher associated risk. However, we cannot conclude anything 
about the performance of our sample, because we only have one ratio. Therefore, it seems 
to us hasty to draw conclusions about the companies considering the information we have, 
since the interpretation of a unique ratio can skew our conclusions. In order to understand 
exactly the performance of the companies, a more in-depth analysis would be necessary, 
which does not fit directly in the scope of our work. 
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Table 2 Panel B: ∆lnOPC defined as the first difference of the logarithm of 
operational costs 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
Austria 0,022 0,006 0,633 -0,383 0,169 0,606 3,921 206 
Belgium -0,005 0,000 0,702 -0,752 0,135 -0,203 4,135 9139 
Estonia -0,007 0,000 0,870 -0,744 0,175 -0,142 3,821 4110 
Finland -0,016 -0,012 1,177 -0,985 0,161 -0,109 4,178 13584 
France 0,005 0,006 0,934 -1,113 0,129 -0,093 4,688 130114 
Germany 0,003 0,009 0,873 -0,632 0,144 -0,254 3,729 12675 
Greece -0,035 -0,029 0,634 -0,766 0,157 -0,068 3,558 7708 
Italy -0,015 -0,011 0,957 -1,113 0,161 -0,122 3,756 175935 
Latvia 0,033 0,035 0,491 -0,556 0,160 -0,165 3,241 608 
Luxembourg -0,013 -0,014 0,328 -0,630 0,147 -0,438 4,060 225 
Netherlands 0,002 0,005 0,565 -1,166 0,153 -0,925 8,838 1220 
Portugal -0,008 -0,007 1,088 -1,168 0,154 -0,067 4,056 51368 
Slovakia -0,007 -0,003 0,970 -1,068 0,175 -0,140 4,266 5676 
Slovenia -0,011 -0,008 0,617 -0,692 0,161 -0,088 3,233 5405 
Spain -0,026 -0,021 1,266 -1,446 0,160 -0,085 3,904 104812 
Total -0,011 -0,006 1,266 -1,446 0,152 -0,140 4,075 5227851 
 
According to Table 2 panel B, and although we use the logarithm, there are still some 
cross-countries differences in ∆lnOPC that ranges from -0,035 in Greece to 0,033 in Latvia. 
The countries of southern Europe have a larger negative mean for this variable than the rest 
of countries, as expected, once the crisis of 2008 had a brutal impact particularly in these 
economies. Besides, it is important to note that for all countries of our sample, the maximum 
value is positive, which means that at least for one year, the operational costs have increased. 
Interestingly, the countries that reached higher values were Finland, Portugal and Spain. 
 
So, these negative values show clearly the impact of the crisis. It is legitimate to argue 
that a decrease of operational costs can be interpreted as efficiency gains, however almost 
every country has negative values, which means that happened something on a global scale, 
that is, a crisis. 
  
                                                          
1 The number of observations for ∆lnOPC is 522 785, because this variable is the first difference of the 
logarithm, so the year 2008 is “lost”. There are 104 993 observations per year, so 5220785+1040993=627778, 
the total number of observations referred in section 3.2. 
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Table 2 Panel C: ∆lnSALES defined as the first difference of the logarithm of sales 
revenue 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
Austria -0,014 -0,006 0,317 -0,394 0,122 -0,321 3,721 206 
Belgium -0,008 -0,003 0,397 -0,595 0,137 -0,180 3,411 9139 
Estonia -0,007 -0,002 0,400 -0,677 0,172 -0,126 2,750 4110 
Finland -0,021 -0,015 0,402 -0,808 0,163 -0,093 2,885 13584 
France 0,001 0,004 0,404 -0,746 0,137 -0,099 3,463 130114 
Germany 0,004 0,008 0,398 -0,695 0,152 -0,167 3,169 12675 
Greece -0,037 -0,034 0,405 -0,804 0,162 -0,056 3,046 7708 
Italy -0,017 -0,012 0,402 -0,868 0,162 -0,067 2,857 175935 
Latvia 0,033 0,032 0,405 -0,378 0,159 -0,025 2,725 608 
Luxembourg -0,011 0,003 0,367 -0,397 0,142 -0,213 3,221 225 
Netherlands 0,001 0,005 0,397 -0,397 0,140 -0,122 3,327 1220 
Portugal -0,013 -0,012 0,623 -0,791 0,159 -0,001 2,852 51368 
Slovakia -0,009 -0,002 0,521 -0,669 0,172 -0,044 2,641 5676 
Slovenia -0,013 -0,010 0,662 -0,648 0,167 -0,040 2,834 5405 
Spain -0,031 -0,026 0,405 -0,707 0,161 0,014 2,795 104812 
Total -0,014 -0,009 0,662 -0,868 0,156 -0,075 2,990 5227852 
 
Table 2 panel C presents some descriptive statistics for ∆lnSALES. The analysis is 
like what we have done before. First, there are some cross-countries differences, where 
Greece has, once again, the lowest value (-0,037) and Latvia has the highest one (0,033). 
Indeed, when we put the countries ordered from the lowest value to the highest, either in 
the ∆lnOPC or in the ∆lnSALES, the order does not change, except for Austria, 
Luxembourg and Estonia. This means that those who see their sales decline tend to decrease 
operating costs albeit not being in the same proportion. This fact shows us that in certain 
situations the costs are sticky, which is consistent with ABJ and other authors referred to in 
literature review. 
  
                                                          
2 The number of observations for ∆lnSALES is 522 785, because this variable is the first difference of the 
logarithm, so the year 2008 is “lost”. There are 104 993 observations per year, so 5220785+1040993=627778, 
the total number of observations referred in section 3.2. 
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Table 2 Panel D: GDPGrowth defined as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
at market prices based on constant local currency, where aggregates are based on 
constant 2010 U.S. dollars 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
Austria 0,546 1,147 2,808 -3,799 2,141 -1,166 3,141 248 
Belgium 0,584 0,783 2,744 -2,253 1,555 -0,492 2,533 10979 
Estonia -0,684 1,937 7,597 -14,724 7,400 -0,881 2,492 4936 
Finland -0,676 0,721 2,992 -8,269 3,734 -1,111 3,076 16321 
France 0,342 0,195 2,079 -2,941 1,661 -0,943 2,903 156174 
Germany 0,709 1,082 4,080 -5,619 3,166 -0,984 2,983 15258 
Greece -4,965 -5,479 -0,335 -9,132 2,831 0,145 2,084 9259 
Italy -1,456 -1,050 1,687 -5,482 2,314 -0,366 2,194 211341 
Latvia -1,494 -3,548 6,381 -14,402 6,915 -0,735 2,409 730 
Luxembourg 0,845 1,093 4,865 -4,359 3,167 -0,317 1,815 270 
Netherlands -0,052 1,403 1,699 -3,768 1,970 -0,873 2,423 1473 
Portugal -1,310 -1,827 1,899 -4,028 1,961 0,258 1,960 61669 
Slovakia 1,874 2,819 5,630 -5,423 3,614 -1,066 3,056 6816 
Slovenia -1,017 0,649 3,300 -7,797 3,505 -0,801 2,678 6497 
Spain -1,345 -0,999 1,118 -3,574 1,614 0,096 1,747 125807 
Total -0,863 -0,999 7,597 -14,724 2,429 -0,664 4,461 627778 
 
This panel D presents the univariate results for GDP growth. As expected, the 
average value for this variable is negative, ranges from -4,965% in Greece to 1,874 % in 
Slovakia. The difference between maximum and minimum values is substantial, which 
indicates great instability. Only Greece could not achieve in any of the years under analysis a 
positive value for GDP growth. The lowest values were recorded in Estonia, Latvia and 
Greece. The fact that values fluctuate is good for our analysis, because it creates conditions 
to study the stickiness of costs in scenarios of optimism (when GDP growth is positive) and 
pessimism (when GDP growth is negative). Therefore, although the period of our sample is 
limited and conditioned by the crisis, there are cross-section differences in the level of GDP 
growth that benefit our analysis. 
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Table 2 Panel E: EPL defined as the mean of TempEPL and RegEPL, range from 
zero to six 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
Austria 1,841 1,841 1,841 1,841 0,000 NA3 NA 248 
Belgium 2,166 2,134 2,229 2,134 0,045 0,707 1,500 10979 
Estonia 2,092 2,309 2,405 1,842 0,251 0,048 1,073 4936 
Finland 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 0,000 NA NA 16321 
France 3,012 3,005 3,047 3,005 0,016 1,788 4,197 156174 
Germany 1,850 1,839 1,902 1,839 0,023 1,795 4,223 15258 
Greece 2,508 2,333 2,776 2,185 0,271 -0,078 1,096 9259 
Italy 2,374 2,381 2,381 2,339 0,016 -1,786 4,189 211341 
Latvia 1,781 1,781 1,781 1,781 0,000 NA NA 242 
Luxembourg 2,998 2,998 2,998 2,998 0,000 NA NA 270 
Netherlands 1,885 1,879 1,911 1,879 0,012 1,779 4,165 1473 
Portugal 2,945 3,034 3,177 2,499 0,245 -0,791 2,167 61669 
Slovakia 2,220 2,232 2,232 2,208 0,012 -0,001 1,000 6816 
Slovenia 1,870 1,924 1,986 1,670 0,107 -0,892 2,405 6497 
Spain 2,530 2,451 2,679 2,305 0,154 -0,221 1,307 125807 
Total 2,582 2,388 3,177 1,670 0,356 -0,050 2,181 6272904 
 
 Regarding EPL, we can say that the analysis of its descriptive statistics must be 
careful, since it is a normalized index, ranges from zero to six, with no direct correspondence 
with reality, that is, it is an unobservable variable. In addition, given that the sample has only 
six years, no major changes to the employment protection legislation are expected. In fact, 
according to the statistics obtained, just six out fifteen countries have changes during the 
period of our sample. The degree of labour rigidity is moderate for most countries, however 
there are important differences, since the maximum value recorded is 3,177 in Portugal 
(stricter EPL) and the lowest value recorded is 1,670 in Slovenia. According to untabled 
results, the trend has been a slight increase in rigidity in labour law. Only Portugal, Spain, 
Slovenia and Greece saw their levels of labour rigidity fall, although the decline was not very 
significant. As such, these countries continue to be those with the highest EPL values, 
excluding Slovenia.  
                                                          
3 Some countries have NA value for Skewness and Kurtosis, because for these countries EPL has the same 
value for all period of sample. 
 
4 The total number of observations is not 627 778, because values are missing for TempEPL and RegEPL 
between 2008 and 2010 in Latvia. 
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Table 2 Panel F: TempEPL is an index of employment protection legislation for 
temporary employees, ranges from zero to six 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
Austria 1,313 1,313 1,313 1,313 0,000 NA NA 248 
Belgium 2,375 2,375 2,375 2,375 0,000 NA NA 10979 
Estonia 2,062 1,875 3,000 1,875 0,419 1,790 4,205 4936 
Finland 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 0,000 NA NA 16321 
France 3,625 3,625 3,625 3,625 0,000 NA NA 156174 
Germany 1,021 1,000 1,125 1,000 0,047 1,795 4,223 15258 
Greece 2,541 2,500 2,750 2,250 0,224 -0,330 1,321 9259 
Italy 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 0,000 NA NA 211341 
Latvia 0,875 0,875 0,875 0,875 0,000 NA NA 242 
Luxembourg 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 0,000 NA NA 270 
Netherlands 0,938 0,938 0,938 0,938 0,000 NA NA 1473 
Portugal 1,917 1,938 1,938 1,813 0,047 -1,794 4,219 61669 
Slovakia 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 0,000 NA NA 6816 
Slovenia 1,667 1,625 1,750 1,625 0,059 0,695 1,483 6497 
Spain 2,802 2,688 3,000 2,563 0,202 -0,116 1,132 125807 
Total 2,529 2,000 3,750 0,875 0,748 0,322 1,868 627290 
 
Table 2 Panel G: RegEPL is an index of employment protection legislation for 
regular employees, ranges from zero to six 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew. Kurtosis Obs. 
Austria 2,369 2,369 2,369 2,369 0,000 NA NA 248 
Belgium 1,956 1,893 2,083 1,893 0,090 0,707 1,500 10979 
Estonia 2,121 1,810 2,742 1,810 0,440 0,704 1,495 4936 
Finland 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 0,000 NA NA 16321 
France 2,399 2,385 2,468 2,385 0,031 1,788 4,197 156174 
Germany 2,679 2,679 2,679 2,679 0,000 NA NA 15258 
Greece 2,476 2,167 2,802 2,119 0,326 -0,004 1,010 9259 
Italy 2,748 2,762 2,762 2,679 0,031 -1,786 4,189 211341 
Latvia 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687 0,000 NA NA 242 
Luxembourg 2,246 2,246 2,246 2,246 0,000 NA NA 270 
Netherlands 2,832 2,821 2,885 2,821 0,024 1,779 4,165 1473 
Portugal 3,974 4,131 4,417 3,185 0,454 -0,677 1,946 61669 
Slovakia 2,627 2,651 2,651 2,603 0,024 -0,001 1,000 6816 
Slovenia 2,073 2,222 2,222 1,714 0,213 -0,789 1,743 6497 
Spain 2,258 2,214 2,357 2,048 0,114 -0,741 2,248 125807 
Total 2,635 2,468 4,417 1,714 0,519 1,992 7,229 627290 
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Table 2 panel F and G present univariate results for TempEPL and RegEPL 
respectively. The mean value of these two variables do not differ significantly, however it is 
curious that countries which have the highest values for TempEPL has the lowest values for 
RegEPL and vice-versa. These values are satisfactory because they once again show differences 
in our sample that allow us to analyse in detail the impact of employment protection 
legislation on the behaviour of costs, namely on operational costs, where labour costs are 
present. 
 
Table 3 Pearson’s Correlation 
  AssetInt ∆lnOPC ∆lnSALES RegEPL TempEPL  EPL GDPGrowth 
AssetInt 1             
∆lnOPC -0,119 1           
∆lnSALES -0,142 0,841 1         
RegEPL 0,114 0,003 -0,004 1       
TempEPL -0,189 0,025 0,020 -0,421 1     
EPL -0,120 0,028 0,018 0,268 0,761 1   
GDPGrowth -0,136 0,266 0,268 -0,095 0,203 0,147 1 
AssetInt is defined as 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
), ∆lnOPC is the first difference of the logarithm of operational costs, 
∆lnSALES is the first difference of logarithm of sales revenue, GDPGrowth is defined as the annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency, EPL is the aggregate index of employment protection 
legislation, computed as the mean of TempEPL (an index of employment protection legislation for temporary employees) 
and RegEPL (an index of employment protection legislation for regular employees). The sample includes companies for 
the 15 Euro Area countries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2013. 
 
The Table 3 shows Pearson’s correlations coefficients between dependent and 
independent variables. The most relevant results are: (i) in general, the correlations between 
our variables are not very substantial (ii) there is a high correlation between operating costs 
and sales (0,841), however, it is not 1, so the relationship is not perfect. As discussed above, 
this means that some costs are sticky (iii) the Pearson´s correlation between operating costs 
and sales is the highest, followed by EPL and TempEPL (0,761). The relationship between 
EPL, TempEPL and RegEPL is natural, since EPL is the mean of these two values (iv) GDP 
growth is positively correlated with operational costs, although the correlation is not strong 
(v) finally, our main independent variable (EPL) is positively correlated with operational costs 
and sales, but the coefficient is higher for operational costs, although these relations are weak.  
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4.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
We report the main results in Table 4. The Original Model (OLS) presents the 
coefficients that were estimated from equation 4 using Panel Unbalanced Least Squares. 
Then, we re-estimated the model but using fixed effects (cross-section and period), because 
we wanted to perceive if the results would be different considering the potential impacts of 
the dynamic effects or not. Finally, we did a third estimation with HAC - Newey-West and 
unstructured data, for the reason that our first estimation showed problems with the classic 
hypotheses, namely the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. This model has 
the same coefficients of Original Model, however t-statistics are different, as expected, and 
so the estimators are more reliable. 
 
The results do not differ significantly between these three estimations. For all models, 
adjusted 𝑅2 (not tabulated) are lower than  𝑅2, thus fulfilling the theoretical assumption. This 
indicator has a high value which indicates that our models can explain a huge percentage of 
dependent variable. Additionally, the complete estimation is done only for four years, since 
we have outdated variables. In panel data estimations there are 104 905 firms included and a 
total number of observations of 417 588. The unstructured estimation included 417 588 
observations after adjustments. 
 
The coefficients of control variables have the expected sign, according to ABJ, in all 
estimations, except for the Asset Intensity. The coefficient associated to the dummy for 
successive sales decreases is positive and significant at 1% level. When demand fluctuates, 
managers pay attention to all information about upward or downward trends. Their 
assessments of the permanence of demand reduction are likely to get stronger as the 
continuum declines of revenue. So, successive declines in sales are interpreted as sign of 
permanent lower demand which motivate managers to cut down some resources, resulting 
in less stickiness. 
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On the other hand, when GDP growth is positive, managers are more reluctant to 
adjust immediately the resources, even if sales decrease, because a decline in sales is more 
likely to persist when the economywide conditions are negative. Therefore, managers would 
be less willing to reduce committed resources in period of macroeconomic growth than in 
periods of decline, reinforcing stickiness of costs. As expected, the estimate of 𝜆7 is negative 
and significant at 1% level. 
 
The last control variable, Asset Intensity, was expected to generate more stickiness, 
since adjustment costs are likely to be higher when selling, general and administrative 
activities rely more on workers and assets owned than services purchased by the company, 
according to ABJ. However, for our data this forecast is not verified, except for the model 
in which we use the fixed effects. 
 
The main parameters of interest are 𝜆5 and 𝜆9, which capture the association between 
the strictness of employment protection legislation and the degree of cost stickiness and the 
relation between the intervention of Troika and stickiness of costs, respectively. The 
significant and negative coefficients on the term that includes EPL (-0,031 *** and  
-0,053 ***) and on the term that includes Troika (-0,056 *** and -0,069 ***) indicate that 
costs are stickier for firms located in countries where the employment protection in higher 
and where the crisis of 2008 was more profound and so the intervention of Troika was 
necessary. These results are consistent with the rationality underling both H1 and H2. 
Therefore, if sales decrease 1 %, the costs will decrease less 0,031% or 0,053% (depending 
on the model considered) in countries with stricter EPL than in other countries. In addition, 
for Portugal and Greece the stickiness of costs is also enhanced by the presence of Troika. 
These two countries react less 0,056% or 0,069% when comparing to the other thirteen 
countries of our sample. 
 
In summary, our estimates indicate that stricter EPL is associated with more 
stickiness and the intervention of Troika also increased the magnitude of cost stickiness. 
Therefore, our results support the new theory of cost behaviour, where it reflects deliberate 
resource commitment decisions made by managers who recognize the implications of 
adjustment costs. 
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Table 4 Estimates of the relation between EPL, Troika and Stickiness 
Coefficient 
Expected 
Sign 
Original 
Model (OLS) 
Model with 
fixed effects 
Model with 
HAC5  
𝛽0 
  0,001 *** -0,000 0,001 *** 
  (4,96) (-0,68) (5,48) 
𝛽1 
+ 0,934 *** 0,919 *** 0,934 *** 
  (103,76) (62,76) (87,78) 
𝜆1 
  -0,047 *** -0,050 *** -0,047 *** 
  (-12,99) (-8,62) (-10,90) 
𝜆2 
  0,002 *** -0,005 *** 0,002 ** 
  (2,68) (-5,42) (2,25) 
𝜆3 
  -0,059 *** -0,052 *** -0,059 *** 
  (-27,90) (-15,15) (-18,35) 
𝜆4 
  -0,021 *** -0,018 *** -0,021 *** 
  (-5,27) (-2,66) (-3,82) 
𝛽2 
- 0,011 0,064 ** 0,011 
  (0,78) (2,45) (0,72) 
𝝀𝟓 
- -0,031 *** -0,053 *** -0,031 *** 
  (-5,61) (-5,11) (-5,21) 
𝜆6 
+ 0,061 *** 0,024 *** 0,061 *** 
  (24,73) (7,46) (18,70) 
𝜆7 
- -0,025 *** -0,015 *** -0,025 *** 
  (-27,54) (-9,87) (-22,21) 
𝜆8 
- 0,002 -0,016 *** 0,002 
  (0,83) (-2,95) (0,62) 
𝝀𝟗 
- -0,056 *** -0,069 *** -0,056 *** 
  (-9,93) (-5,84) (-8,48) 
          
𝑅2   0,688 0,727 0,688 
Prob(F-statistic)   0,000 0,000 0,000 
Durbin-Watson stat   2,617 2,965 2,617 
Prob(Wald F-statistic)   - - 0,000 
Cross-sections included (Firms)   104905 104905 - 
Total observations   417588 417588 417588 
AssetInt is defined as 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
), ∆lnOPC is the first difference of the logarithm of operational costs, 
∆lnSALES is the first difference of logarithm of sales revenue, GDPGrowth is defined as the annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency, EPL is the aggregate index of employment protection 
legislation, DEC is a dummy variable equals to one for firms whose sales decrease in the period t-1, TROIKA is a 
dummy variable equals to one for Portuguese and Greek firms. The sample includes companies for the 15 Euro Area 
countries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2013. Coefficient values are listed at the first row and t-statistics are 
in parentheses. The symbol * means that the variables is significant at 10% level, ** means that the variable is 
significant at 5% level, and *** means that the variable is significant at the 1% level. 
 
                                                          
5 HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 26.0000) 
35 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
In this section, we will present some additional tests in Table 5, in order to check if 
our results are robust enough. In this sense, we extend our study, by re-estimate the model 
after discarding the data for the France and Italy firms, since these firms are more than 50% 
of our sample and could thus have a disproportionate impact on the estimates. The estimates 
after we discard the FR and IT data reinforce the importance of EPL (𝜆5 = -0,156 ***) but 
changes the expected signal with respect to the effect of Troika (𝜆9 = 0,019 ***). Possibility, 
it is due to the fact the crisis affected more these countries than the France and Italy and so, 
even when sales decreased after an increase, managers were not confident enough to 
maintain slack resources and so they cut it. 
 
In addition, we also replace the main index of EPL with two more detailed measures, 
i.e, TempEPL and RegEPL. The equation is very similar to our main model and it is as follows: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 + 𝜆1.1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆1.2𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝜆3𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐) ∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 + (𝛽2 + 𝜆5.1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐
+ 𝜆5.2𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆6𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝜆7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜆8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜆9𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐)𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑓,𝑡                                         (5) 
 
In this additional analysis, H1 implies that stricter RegEPL and TempEPL should 
increase the degree of cost stickiness (i.e., the coefficients of both variables should be 
negative). In fact, the coefficients are negative and significant at 1% level.  
 
Because cost stickiness may be influenced by the size of the firm, we also control for 
this aspect by splitting the data into two subsamples of small versus large firms. The 
separation was done according to the median of number of employees, i.e., when a firm was 
median or above median was classified as large, but when it was below median, the firm was 
classified as small. For our sample the median number of employees was twelve. The main 
results of this robustness check are similar, which reinforces the importance of both the 
labour law and the Troika intervention in cost behaviour. 
  
36 
 
Table 5 Robustness Tests 
Coefficient 
Expected 
Sign 
Subsample 
excluding 
FR and IT 
Model with 
RegEPL and 
TempEPL 
Subsample 
Large 
Firms 
Subsample 
Small 
Firms 
𝛽0 
  0,000 0,001 *** 0,003 *** -0,003 *** 
  (0,22) (5,00) (10,35) (-6,82) 
𝛽1 
+ 0,596 *** 0,847 *** 0,822 *** 0,846 *** 
  (38,86) (69,43) (67,28) (42,41) 
𝜆1.1 
  0,111 *** 0,012 *** 0,009 * -0,011 
  (16,96) (2,93) (1,75) (-1,35) 
𝜆1.2 
    -0,024 ***     
    (-13,18)     
𝜆2 
  0,001 0,000 *** 0,005 *** -0,001 
  (0,89) (7,01) (7,28) (-0,99) 
𝜆3 
  -0,054 *** -0,060 *** -0,050 *** -0,063 *** 
  (-17,66) (-28,82) (-16,80) (-17,41) 
𝜆4 
  -0,120 *** -0,062 *** -0,007  -0,085 *** 
  (-22,67) (-11,14) (-1,46) (-12,26) 
𝛽2 
- 0,284 *** 0,165 *** 0,059 *** 0,139 *** 
  (12,54) (9,14) (2,89) (4,83) 
𝝀𝟓 
- -0,156 ***   -0,054 *** -0,086 *** 
  (-16,34)   (-6,57) (-7,49) 
𝝀𝟓.𝟏 
-   -0,080 ***     
    (-14,28)     
𝝀𝟓.𝟐 
-   -0,013 ***     
    (-4,53)     
𝜆6 
+ 0,047 *** 0,059 *** 0,047 *** 0,056 *** 
  (12,74) (24,01) (13,04) (14,32) 
𝜆7 
- -0,022 *** -0,021 *** -0,031 *** -0,018 *** 
  (-18,82) (-32,39) (-27,34) (-11,32) 
𝜆8 
- 0,018 *** 0,006 ** -0,029 *** 0,024 *** 
  (4,56) (2,00) (-6,67) (5,30) 
𝝀𝟗 
- 0,019 *** 0,019 ** -0,061 *** -0,001 
  (2,64) (2,38) (-8,19) (-0,11) 
            
𝑅2   0,701 0,688 0,752 0,656 
Prob(F-statistic)   0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Durbin-Watson stat   2,597 2,618 2,570 2,657 
Cross-sections included (firms)   43470 104905 51917 50362 
Total observations    172992 417588 173160 159630 
AssetInt is defined as 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
), ∆lnOPC is the first difference of the logarithm of operational costs, 
∆lnSALES is the first difference of logarithm of sales revenue, GDPGrowth is defined as the annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency, EPL is the aggregate index of employment protection 
legislation, computed as the mean of TempEPL (an index of employment protection legislation for temporary employees) 
and RegEPL (an index of employment protection legislation for regular employees), DEC is a dummy variable equals 
to one for firms whose sales decrease in the period t-1, TROIKA is a dummy variable equals to one for Portuguese and 
Greek firms. The sample includes companies for the 15 Euro Area countries and the sample period is from 2008 to 
2013. Coefficient values are listed at the first row and t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbol *, ** and *** means 
that the variables is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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We also estimate the framework developed by Banker et al. (2014), which show that 
stickiness documented by ABJ represents a combination of two phenomena, that is stickiness 
when sales increase in prior period and anti-stickiness after prior sales decrease. As 
mentioned before, these authors explained these patterns due to manager optimism or 
pessimism following increase or decrease sales, respectively. So, following Banker et al. (2014), 
we introduce interactions with manager pessimism and optimism on both slopes and in the 
impact of EPL and Troika on both slopes, which proxies for pessimism and optimism using 
dummies for prior sales decrease and increase. The new estimation model is as follows: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐
+ 𝜆1
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜆4
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐 + 𝜆4
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐) ∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ (𝛽2
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝜆5
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐
+ 𝜆5
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 + 𝜆6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜆7𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜆8
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐
+ 𝜆8
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐾𝐴𝑐)𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑓,𝑡∆𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑐,𝑓,𝑡                                                                                                               (6)    
 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable equal to one if sales in prior period increase and zero 
otherwise, and 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑐,𝑓,𝑡−1 has the same logic, but for decreases in sales. These two variables 
are proxies for optimism and pessimism, respectively. The other variables have the same 
meaning already attributed in the previous model. The parameters 𝛽2
𝑂𝑃𝑇and 𝛽2
𝑃𝐸𝑆 capture 
the impact of the optimism and pessimism on the level of stickiness and anti-stickiness. The 
main parameters of interest are 𝜆5
𝑂𝑃𝑇and 𝜆5
𝑃𝐸𝑆, in relation to EPL and 𝜆8
𝑂𝑃𝑇 and 𝜆8
𝑃𝐸𝑆, 
regarding the intervention of Troika. First, H1 implies that both 𝜆5
𝑂𝑃𝑇and 𝜆5
𝑃𝐸𝑆 are negative, 
because stricter EPL might increase stickiness when managers are optimistic and reduce  
anti-stickiness when managers are pessimists. Then, H2 implies that both 𝜆8
𝑂𝑃𝑇 and 𝜆8
𝑃𝐸𝑆 are 
negative, since the intervention of Troika should increase stickiness in the optimistic cases 
and reduce anti-stickiness in the pessimistic case. All results are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Estimates after controlling for manager optimism and pessimism  
Coefficient 
Expected 
Sign 
Original Model 
(OLS) 
Model with 
fixed effects 
Model with 
HAC 
𝛽0 
  0,001 *** -0,000 0,001 *** 
  (3,82) (-1,10) (4,22) 
𝛽1
𝑂𝑃𝑇 
+ 0,898 *** 0,820 *** 0,898 *** 
  (67,45) (40,57) (66,83) 
𝛽1
𝑃𝐸𝑆 
+ 0,980 *** 0,980 *** 0,980 *** 
  (81,37) (57,36) (61,76) 
𝜆1
𝑂𝑃𝑇 
  -0,011 ** 0,002 -0,011 ** 
  (-2,14) (0,29) (-2,12) 
𝜆1
𝑃𝐸𝑆 
  -0,080 *** -0,081 *** -0,080 *** 
  (-16,61) (-11,95) (-12,57) 
𝜆2 
  0,005 *** -0,004 *** 0,005 *** 
  (7,54) (-3,85) (6,29) 
𝜆3 
  -0,048 *** -0,045 *** -0,048 *** 
  (-22,74) (-12,92) (-15,05) 
𝜆4
𝑂𝑃𝑇 
  -0,002 -0,016 * -0,002 
  (-0,29) (-1,81) (-0,25) 
𝜆4
𝑃𝐸𝑆 
  -0,033 *** -0,024 *** -0,033 *** 
  (-6,31) (-3,04) (-4,19) 
𝛽2
𝑂𝑃𝑇 
- 0,094 *** 0,208 *** 0,094 *** 
  (4,71) (6,44) (4,16) 
𝛽2
𝑃𝐸𝑆 
+ -0,022 -0,025 -0,022 
  (-1,14) (-0,84) (-0,95) 
𝝀𝟓
𝑶𝑷𝑻 
- -0,086 *** -0,124 *** -0,086 *** 
  (-10,89) (-9,68) (-9,71) 
𝝀𝟓
𝑷𝑬𝑺 
- 0,021 *** 0,002 0,021 ** 
  (2,76) (0,13) (2,28) 
𝜆6 
- -0,028 *** -0,016 *** -0,028 *** 
  (-30,94) (-10,53) (-24,81) 
𝜆7 
- -0,008 *** -0,025 *** -0,008 ** 
  (-2,84) (-4,50) (-2,11) 
𝝀𝟖
𝑶𝑷𝑻 
- -0,069 *** -0,053 *** -0,069 *** 
  (-8,49) (-3,73) (-7,22) 
𝝀𝟖
𝑷𝑬𝑺 
- -0,049 *** -0,076 *** -0,049 *** 
  (-6,69) (-5,81) (-5,04) 
          
𝑅2   0,689 0,727 0,689 
Prob(F-statistic)   0,000 0,000 0,000 
Durbin-Watson stat   2,623 2,966 2,623 
Prob(Wald F-statistic)   - - 0,000 
Cross-sections included (firms)   104905 104905 104905 
Total observations    417588 417588 417588 
AssetInt is defined as 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
), ∆lnOPC is the first difference of the logarithm of operational costs, ∆lnSALES is the 
same for sales revenue, GDPGrowth is defined as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency, EPL is the aggregate index of employment protection legislation, DEC is a dummy variable equals to one for firms 
whose sales decrease in the period t-1, INC is a dummy variable equals to one for firms whose sales increase in the period t-1, 
TROIKA is a dummy variable equals to one for Portuguese and Greek firms. The sample includes 15 Euro Area countries from 
2008 to 2013. Coefficient values are listed at the first row and t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbol *, ** and *** means 
that the variables is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
39 
 
Our results are not consistent with the Banker et al. (2014) findings for Selling, General 
and Administrative costs in the American firms for most of coefficients. We find that, on 
average for our data, operating costs are not sticky in the optimistic case, since the term 
𝛽2
𝑂𝑃𝑇is positive and significant at 1%, when the expected signs was negative. Relatively to 
anti-sticky in the pessimistic case, the coefficient 𝛽2
𝑃𝐸𝑆 is negative but not significant. The 
main parameters in analysis are those associated to EPL and Troika. The EPL coefficient in 
case of optimism is consistent with theory and so it is negative, however, in pessimism case 
it not happens. Contrary to what would be expected, the estimate is positive. Finally, the 
results for Troika´s intervention are similar to our main estimation, where the coefficients 
are negative and significant at 1 % level. 
 
These findings prove the impact of the crisis in cost behaviour. Actually, the period 
between 2008 and 2013 was characterized by an extreme pessimism. It is clear in our results, 
because although EPL and Troika increase adjustment costs, managers chose to effectively 
cut resources, which made anti-stickiness phenomenon increase in presence of higher EPL. 
We believe these results are consistent with this new theory of cost behaviour, although the 
coefficients have different signs, because the managers were afraid that with the crisis the 
labour restriction and the intervention of the Troika would increase and therefore the 
adjustment costs would grow as well. 
  
40 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we investigated the costs behaviour, namely the relation between 
employment protection legislation, the intervention of Troika and sticky cost behaviour. The 
new theory of sticky costs predicts that many costs arise due to the deliberate resources 
commitment decisions made by managers. So, adjustment costs play an important role in 
this new theory, since managers react on changes in output by assessing the pros and cons 
of actually changing the resources. 
 
The empirical tests of the theory have been hampered by the difficulty of having a 
direct measure for adjustment costs. For this reason, we use the EPL as proxy for adjustment 
costs with labour factor. Cross-country differences in EPL stickiness provide a reliable 
source of variation in the adjustment costs for labour resources. We also consider that the 
intervention of Troika increased the adjustment costs, especially those related to labour 
resources. Based on it, we predict that both aspects mentioned above increase the stickiness 
of costs. 
 
Our sample includes 104 993 active manufacturing firms (NACE 10-32, excluding 
18) covered by Amadeus during 2008-2013 from 15 Euro Area countries (i.e., Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain). We use many alternative model 
specifications as panel data, unstructured data, fixed effects and HAC – Newey-West, to 
control for different problems. 
 
The main results are robust and strongly support our predictions, validating the 
proposition that deliberate resource commitment decisions are the main explanation for cost 
stickiness, in the presence of adjustment costs. 
 
Our results have implications for managers and other corporate decisions makers. 
Choices based on the traditional theory of cost behaviour will overestimate the 
responsiveness of costs to decreases in the level of activity and underestimate the reaction 
of costs in the presence of an increase in activity level. In this sense, if managers still making 
decisions based on traditional theory, they will make decisions that endanger the company. 
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The main limitation of our study is the fact that the period covered by our analysis 
not only is too short but also coincides with the years of the 2008 crisis. It does not allow us 
to be certain if the results are too influenced by the economic environment that has been felt 
in recent years, although we believe so. In this sense, we suggest that future work on this 
scope should cover a longer and more diversified period, including years before and after the 
referred crisis. 
 
Additionally, studying this subject at a more micro level may be a good option for 
future research, since even within the same country it is possible to obtain different levels of 
stickiness/anti-stickiness according to the sector studied. Although the manufacturing sector 
is fairly diverse, our analysis focused more on the cross-county differences and not so much 
on the specificities of the sectors. So, future research can include more firm-level variables 
such earnings volatility, share price performance, return on assets or return on equity. Besides 
that, it can also have some disadvantages. Because we use a large sample with different 
counties, we were able to demonstrate the impact of economy-wide structural variables on 
cost behaviour, otherwise it would be impossible.  
 
Finally, the legal origin of counties is fundamental to explain some differences, 
namely in market labour. Thus, it would be interesting to confront countries with different 
regimes to perceive if this has an impact on results, as expected or not. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Calculation of the indicators of EPL strictness reported in OECD (2004) 
 
 For each country, employment protection legislation is described along 14 basic items 
in OECD (2004) and represents the legislative provisions governing the firing of regular 
employees, which address issues such as severance payment levels or the length of notice 
period before the dismissal. Additionally, they also reflect some protection for temporary 
employees, for example, the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts. Moreover, these 14 
items can be classified in two main areas: 
 
i) employment protection of regular workers against individual dismissal; and 
ii) regulation of temporary forms of employment. 
 
Then, these items are aggregated into summary indexes of employment protection 
legislation for regular employments (RegEPL) and for temporary employments (TempEPL). 
Finally, when all these indexes are merged we have the overall index of employment 
protection, i.e. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐 . 
 
The first step of the procedure of OEDC (2004) was therefore to score all the  
first-level measures of EPL in comparable units and so converted each basic item into a 
numerical score that were normalized to range from 0 to 6, with higher scores representing 
stricter regulation. The renormalization rules are presented in third column of Panel A and 
B. After all, it was computed, for each country, an overall summary indicator based on the 
two subcomponents: strictness of regulation for regular contracts and temporary contracts, 
as a weighted average of the numerical scores for basic items, with weights presented in Panel 
C.
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Table 7 Panel A EPL for regular employees (source: Table 2.A1.1 in OECD 2004) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Scale 0-3
0 when an oral statement is enough;
Item 1 1 when a written statement of the reasons for  dismissal 
Dismissal notification    must be supplied to the employee;
procedures 2 when a third party (such as works council  or the competent
   labour authority) must  be notified;
3 when the employer cannot proceed  to dismissal without
   authorisation from a third  party.
Delay in days
Estimated time includes, where relevant,  the following assumptions:  
Item 2 6 days are counted in case of required warning procedure, 1 day 
Delay involved before  when dismissal can be notified orally or the notice can be directly ≤2  < 10  < 18  < 26  < 35  < 45  ≥ 45
notice can start handed to the employee, 2 days when a letter needs to be sent by 
mail and 3 days  when this must be a registered letter.
Notice period in months 
Item 3 9 months tenure   0  ≤ 0.4  ≤ 0.8  ≤ 1.2  < 1.6 < 2  ≥ 2
Length of the notice period at                  4 years tenure 0  ≤ 0.75 ≤ 1.25  < 2  < 2.5 < 3.5  ≥ 3.5
20 years tenure < 1  ≤ 2.75  < 5  < 7  < 9 < 11  ≥ 11
Months pay
Item 4 9 months tenure   0  ≤ 0.5  ≤ 1  ≤ 1.75  ≤ 2.5 < 3  ≥ 3
Severance pay at 4 years tenure 0  ≤ 0.5  ≤ 1  ≤ 2  ≤ 3 < 4  ≥ 4
20 years tenure 0  ≤ 3  ≤ 6  ≤ 10  ≤ 12  ≤ 18  > 18
Assignment of numerical scores of strictness 
Scale * 2
Basic Item Decription
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Table 7 Panel A (continued): EPL for regular employees (source: Table 2.A1.1 in OECD 2004) 
 
 
  
Scale 0-3
0 when worker capability or redundancy  of the job are adequate 
Item 5    and sufficient ground for dismissal;
Definition of justified 1 when social considerations, age or job tenure  must when possible 
or unfair dismissal    influence the choice of which worker(s) to dismiss;
2 when a transfer and/or a retraining to adapt the worker to different 
   work must be attempted  prior to dismissal;
3 when worker capability cannot be a ground  for dismissal.
Months
Item 6 Period within which, regular contracts are not fully  covered by 
Length of trial period employment protection provisions and unfair dismissal claims ≥ 24 > 12 > 9 > 5 > 2.5  ≥ 1.5 < 1.5
can usually not be made.
Item 7 Months pay
Compensation following   ≤ 3  ≤ 8  ≤ 12  ≤ 18  ≤ 24  ≤ 30  > 30
unfair dismissal
Scale 0-3
Item 8 The extend of reinstatement is based upon whether, after
Possibility of reinstatement finding of unfair dismissal, the employee has the option of
following unfair dismissal reinstatement into his/her previous job, even if this is against  
the wishes of the employer.
Scale * 2
Scale * 2
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Table 7 Panel B: EPL for temporary employment (source: Table 2.A1.1 in OECD 2004) 
 
 
 
Basic Item 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Scale 0-3
0 fixed-term contracts are permitted only  for “objective” or “material 
   situation”, i.e.  to perform a task which itself is of fixed duration;
Item 9 1 if specific exemptions apply to situations  of employer need 
Valid cases for us of fixed-term contracts (FTC)   (e.g. launching a new activity) or employee need (e.g.workers  
   in search of their first job);
2 when exemption exist on both the employer  and employee sides;
3 when there are no restrictions on the use  of fixed-term contracts.
Item 10 Number of contracts No limit ≥ 5 ≥ 4 ≥ 3 ≥ 2 ≥ 1.5 <1.5
Maximum number  of successive FTC
Item 11 Months No limit ≥ 36 ≥ 30 ≥ 24 ≥ 18 ≥ 12 <12
Maximum cumulated  duration of successive  FTC   
Item 12 Scale (0-4)
Types of work for which  temporary work agency  0 when TWA employment is illegal;
 (TWA) employment is legal 1-3  1 to 3 depending upon the degree  of restrictions;
4  when no restrictions apply.
Item 13 Yes or No
Restrictions on number  of renewals - - No - Yes - -
Item 14 Months
Maximum cumulated  duration of TWA  contracts No limit ≥ 36 ≥ 24 ≥ 18 ≥ 12 > 6 ≤6
Decription Assignment of numerical scores of strictness 
6 - Scale * 6/4
6 - Scale * 2
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Table 7 Panel C: EPL summary indicators at four successive levels of aggregation (source: Table 2.A1.2 in OECD 2004) 
 
Level 4 index Level 3 index Level 2 index
Scale 0 - 6 Scale 0 - 6 Scale 0 - 6 Scale 0 - 6 Weights
1. Notification procedures (1/2)
2. Delay to start a notice (1/2)
3. Notice period after: 9 months                   (1/7)
                                 4 years (1/7)
                                 20 years (1/7)
4. Severance pay after: 9 months     (4/21)
                                 4 years (4/21)
                                 20 years (4/21)
5. Definition of unfair dismissal (1/4)
6. Trial period (1/4)
7. Compensation (1/4)
8. Reinstatement (1/4)
9. Valid cases for us of FTC (1/2)
10. Maximum number of successive FTC (1/4)
11. Maximum cumulated duration of FTC  (1/4)
12. Types of work for which is legal (1/2)
13. Restrictions on number  of renewals (1/4)
14. Maximum cumulated  duration contracts (1/4)
Procedural
inconveniences (1/3)
Difficulty of dismissal
(1/3)
Notice and severance pay
for no-fault individual
dismissals (1/3)
Level 1 variables (basic items)
Fixed term contracts
(1/2)
Temporary work agency
employment (1/2)
Regular contracts - RegEPL  (1/2)
Temporary contracts - TempEPL  (1/2)
Overall summary
indicator (EPL )
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